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Resource based views of the firm and in particular Kay’s (1995) model of sustainable 
competitive advantage have been used to advance an understanding of differences in the 
competitive advantage of private sector firms. We extend the analysis to a public sector firm 
where its major purpose includes engaging in public good by giving away its knowledge base 
and services. The case highlights the paradox that many public sector organisations face in 
simultaneously pursuing public good and sustainable competitive advantage. While Kay’s 
model is applicable for understanding intergovernmental agency competition, we find it 
necessary to incorporate Resource Dependency Theory to address the paradox. Implications 
for theory and practice are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Kay (1995) presents the notion of sustained competitive advantage in organisations obtained 
through relational architecture, reputation, innovation and strategic assets. At the core of 
Kay’s model is the resource based theory of the firm which focuses on the internal attributes 
or the resources and capabilities of the firm where, in order for the resources and capabilities 
of a firm to provide superior performance, they must be (1) valuable in the sense of enabling a 
firm to exploit its environmental opportunities (and/or neutralise its threats), (2) rare among 
its current or potential competitors, (3) costly to imitate, and (4) without close strategic 
substitutes (Barney, 1991).  Kay states that organizations have a strong architecture where 
there is an expectation of long-term relationships both within the firm and among its 
members, a commitment to sharing the rewards of collective achievement and a high but 
unstructured degree of informality. He contends that this architecture adds value to individual 
contributions of its members through the creation of organizational knowledge, through the 
establishment of a cooperative ethic within the organization and by the implementation of 
organizational routines. 
For Kay (1995:27) and others (See the work of the IMP group, (Hakansson, 1982, 1987, 
1989; Axelsson and Easton, 1992; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Moller and Wilson, 1995), 
good commercial relationships are fashioned through cooperation (joint activity towards a 
shared goal), coordination (the need for mutually consistent responses) and differentiation 
(the avoidance of mutually incompatible activities).  However, Kay in passing, also suggests 
that the notion of sustained competitive advantage is relevant for understanding the 
differences in performances of non-profit organizations in situations, “where the added value 
or benefits are not retained by the firm, but instead are distributed to its members or the 
community” (Kay, 1995:174).  Unfortunately Kay does not give attention to the paradox this 
raises where the purpose of the organisation is to create knowledge and services and give 
them away for the public good rather than maximising private profit.  
2.  Competitive Advantage and Public Sector Firms – Exploring the 
Paradox  
According to the resource based theory of the firm, the basis of sustainable competitive 
advantage of a firm stems from its capabilities such as value, rareness, inimitability and 
organization (Barney, 1991, 1996) or more generally reputation, innovation, architecture and 
strategic assets (Kay, 1995). Successful private sector firms use their capabilities to add value 
by using these capabilities in a proactive way and by demonstrating appropriability, or the 
ability to realise the benefits of a distinctive capability for the benefit of the firm itself, rather 
than its customers, suppliers or competitors. 
Public sector organisations and government departments are created to fulfil responsibilities 
of government and are expected to cooperate in the policy development and the delivery of 
services. In western societies, public agencies are often created under the guise of addressing 
market failure and are maintained to contribute to the common good. In the case of public 
sector R&D, their role is also to contribute to the development of industry, and the creation of 
markets.  
Most of the writing on competitive advantage, like the theoretical rationale for purchaser-
provider forms of relationships, builds on agency theory. A general proposition of agency 
theory is that those in control of resources will serve their own interests, rather than those who 
own the resources (Stewart, 1999).  In contrast, public sector organisations are created to 
develop and deliver service for the benefit of the populace. For example, public sector 
Agriculture R&D organisations create knowledge of use to producers and other members of 
 4
the supply chain, such as processors and distributors. Their purpose is not for commercial 
transactions to benefit a few, but to develop a sustainable capability of the industry in terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  In the case of agriculture, the outputs and outcomes that are 
targeted include better strains of plant varieties suitable for the local environment or for 
specific end products, better practices which generate higher yield, and farming practices 
which value the whole environment and its sustainability. 
Public sector organisations are funded from a central source of government funds, where 
the constraints of a largely ‘fixed pie’ creates competition with other government agencies for 
funding.  Each firm must have resources and capabilities and must take into account their 
environment and negotiate with relevant sources of funding including Departments of 
Treasury for resources. In this sense they are largely dependent on their environment for 
resources. Most importantly, they are also dependent upon other bodies, such as Ministerial 
cabinets, for deciding on their direction and scope of operation. In comparison, private sector 
organizations have governance structures that provide direction and scope of operations that 
are intended to serve their own interests.   
3. Case study of Sun State Agriculture 
 
We investigate this paradox of sustainable competitive advantage where the purpose of the 
organization is to create knowledge and services and give them away for the public good 
rather than maximise private profit, in an Agriculture public science organization. We begin 
by using Kay’s framework of architecture, reputation, innovation and strategic assets to 
identify the specific capabilities of the organisation and examine the effect on these 
capabilities over two recent phases of internal restructuring. These phases are the 
implementation of purchaser- provider relationships within the organization to create distinct 
business groups focused on distinct areas of R&D and secondly, bringing together the 
business units to form a new united and coordinated structure with other R&D units focused 
on research and development.  
 
Methodology 
Our data was collected through 50 interviews with senior and middle management 
staff members, external stakeholders and observations and archival records over a two-year 
period. This collection occurred at the project, program, Institute (Business Group) and 
organisational levels of this State Government organization while it was undergoing 
restructuring. 
Sun State Agriculture  
 
The organisation under study is an Australian State Department of Primary Industries, in “Sun 
State”, a large government organisation whose primary activities focus on research, 
development and extension (RD&E), information services and regulatory functions serving 
fisheries, forestry and agriculture industries. The organisation’s agricultural research involves 
research, development and extension, where extension is the name given to the dissemination 
of the results of the agricultural research with either no or little cost to the farming 
community. As a government organization, its major stakeholder is the government of the 
day. It’s mission in 1998-999 was to be an “innovator and a responsible partner with the Food 
and Fibre Sectors of Sun State and to help industry meet the increasing demand of customers 
in domestic and export markets for higher levels of quality in the products and services they 
produce”.  However, regardless of mission statements made by the Government of the day, 
senior executives of the organisation see its roles as fostering  (rural) community 
development, economic returns and a sustainable environment. 
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Sun State Department has an annual budget of more than $350 million (AUS) and a 
workforce of over 4000 staff spread across a large geographic area. Agriculture is a leading 
contributor to Sun State’s economy accounting for 36% of the value of the State’s overseas 
exports and 21% of Australia’s rural exports” (Sun State Annual Report, 1997-98). It is the 
largest of the seven Australian State/Territory Agricultural departments. Each of the these 
State/Territory government agricultural Research/ Science organisations compete with each 
other and with private sector providers for national research and development funds and 
overseas contracts. In Australia as elsewhere, a National Competition Policy in which a 
government agency must not engage in bidding practices that take undue advantage of their 
infrastructure being underwritten through the public purse, constrains their competitive 
behaviour.  
Like many R&D organisations in agriculture world wide, this organisation is operating in a 
very competitive  ‘mature’ market, with a decreasing number of people engaged in rural 
production industries. The dynamic nature of challenges which this state faces include 
changes in technologies, an increasing consumer focus on ecological sustainability, and 
increasing global competition for supplying agricultural products, and declining funding from 
Government sources.  Though not unique to government departments in Australia (Alston, 
Pardey, Philip, Roseboom, (1998), Byerlee (1998), Fuglie, Day, Klotz, Ollinger, Reilly, 
Vasavada, Yee, 1996) all of these forces have been pressuring senior management within this 
department to find ways to change its organisational arrangements to improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness.   
The history of recent changes in Sun State Agriculture can be seen in Figure 1.  In 1997, 
Sun State engaged in a structural realignment that was guided by a purchaser-provider model 
(FitzGerald, Charmichael, McDonough and Thornton, 1996). The purchaser-provider model 
was intended to separate the purchaser function from the provider function to improve 
accountability and transparency, and improve efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of 
services and outcomes to targeted clients (Shulman, Wollin, Duffield, Steffens & Wissemann, 
1997). 
The organisation’s structure and governance were changed through the amalgamation of 
regional and discipline silo groups into industry focused R, D and E business “provider” 
groups or institutes (Shulman et al., 1997).  At the time of this study, the organization had re-
organised its RD&E resources, including its approximately 800 research projects, into a state-
wide network of industry-based business institutes for beef, horticulture, farming systems, 
sheep and wool, and food technology.  Each institute or business group, as a provider of 
RD&E, formed partnerships within the department and externally with other organizations.  
The main purchaser of these services was the Minister through his representatives (Director 
General and/or Industry Program Coordinators). The governance of each of these 
commercially focused industry Institutes was guided by an advisory board comprised of 
supply chain industry representatives who often occupied key positions in farming interest 
and lobby groups and/or were on Boards of commodity marketing or funding organisations.  
These representatives were to guide the direction of the business units.  The Director General 
with the consent of the Minister appointed a Director for each Institute. The initial staffing of 
each Institute was comprised of staff that had previously been dispersed through the prior 
regional structure, but were engaged in on-going R&D projects in specific commodity areas.  
In implementing this restructuring, these business groups were provided with a non-
negotiable core budget (block grant) from Departmental funds to cover inherited staff and 
projects. Many projects had at least 3 to 4 years of contractual work to be completed. In 
addition to the core budget, each RD&E business unit was able and encouraged to seek 
competitive external funding, a practice previously engaged in by senior research scientists.  
Most of the opportunities for obtaining competitive funding were through Industry 
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associations and research and development funding corporations that obtained 50% of their 
monies from commodity levies and 50% from matching federal funds, and through 
international granting agencies as the World Bank. Their major Australian based competitors 
for these funds were usually six other national or state based Agricultural research Agencies 
or from research groups based in 38 Australian Universities. The success rate in winning 
these competitive funded projects varied considerably across Institutes/business Units. The 
majority, however, obtained 20-48% of their entire operating budget through these 
competitive mechanisms. But the bulk of their funding was from the Sun State Minister’s 
office, and was largely based on historical formulae, a proportion of the resource funding to 
the larger Sun State primary industry organisation allocated by the state government and 
Treasury on the basis of historical performance in achieving specific objectives in the delivery 
of services.  
In late 1999, the Minister announced that in response to an external review of the Institute 
structures, a integrative Food and Fibre provider Agency would be created to drive research in 
areas that go across the Industry based Sector Institutes (such as sustainability and 
biotechnology), and would demonstrate before the next election, that the Government was 
concerned about the long term future of the rural community. Under this restructure, the fund 
raising and research activities of each research Institute/ Business unit would be reviewed and 
guided by the Executive Director of the Food and Fibre Sciences Agency to maximise 
collaboration amongst the business units and to present a single public face on substantive 
new economic, environmental and community issues- for instance genetic modification and 
salinity. 
4.  Analysis: Sustainable competitive advantage in public sector R&D 
organisations 
 
Using Kay’s criteria of innovation, reputation, architecture and strategic assets, we proceed to 
a more detailed analysis of the organisation and its business units to assess their progress 
towards sustainable competitive advantage over the last 18 months.  We begin with 
innovation, reputation and strategic assets of Kay’s model and then examine the architecture, 
using the three categories of relationship architecture outlined in Kay (1995), i.e. internal, 
external and network relationships further illustrate the opportunities gained by these changes 
for competitive advantage. 
Innovation.  Innovation in Kay’s model usually implies both market and position. Both 
market and position are a focus of the organisation and its business units (Sun State Annual 
Report 1998-1999).  Innovations have occurred in creating new market niches for existing 
products, and new products for existing markets, as well as the increased application of 
technologies used in other fields to agriculture.  R&D has a developed a tighter value chain 
focus, from crop varieties to storage issues and pest management and the involvement of 
other stakeholders has increased. 
Two of the five business groups are positioning themselves as leaders in their field in terms 
of breeding of particular crop varieties and in terms of developing proposals to be prime 
stakeholders for leading research centres in their areas of specialty.  Others have become 
preferred providers for R&D corporations. Kay’s concept of innovation as relevant to both 
market and position clearly applies in public sector R&D corporations. 
Reputation.  Kay (1995) argues that the reputation of a firm is created in a specific market. 
In an R&D context, the reputation of the firm has a close relationship between the reputation 
of the scientists and the reputation of the organisation with consequences for relationships 
with stakeholders and funding bodies.  The reputation of individual scientists had previously 
been well established and the formation of specific business groups built on the previous good 
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reputations and thrust many into a more major role, providing opportunities to highlight the 
work of these scientists. Since the creation of specific business groups, some business groups 
rather than a project team become preferred suppliers, and on the basis of their reputations, 
have received direct invitations from external funding organisations to carry out specific 
RD&E programs. Others have increased their sources of R&D funding from R&D 
corporations.  
The nature of a firm’s reputation is of course competitive and reflects the context of the 
organization and its relationships with others and closeness to the customer and reputation for 
the delivery of quality products and processes.  The issue of reputation in a competitive world 
needs to be constantly renewed.  Staff recognised the importance of reputation developing 
over time at all levels of the work unit as well as the role of project leaders, and the 
importance of reputation for receiving funding through interactions. 
Strategic Assets.  The business groups are responsible for the day-to-day running costs of 
the research stations and since the restructuring and tighter controls now manage these 
resources including knowledge resources and the commercialisation of intellectual property in 
a more comprehensive way. The business groups have become more commercial in focus, 
and are now undertaking more strategic decision-making regarding the direction of the 
business groups, the types of R&D being undertaken and the strategic assets both human and 
physical required for now and the future. They have planned and contracted for the building 
of new laboratories, a building programme, and more bio-technological laboratories to extend 
their existing work. However to obtain the necessary resources for such capital works, the 
business groups must engage in lobbying and promotion of the present and future worth of 
their research programs. They have taken a more active communication and marketing role 
with their stakeholders, within their own organization with the CEO and the Minister. 
Structure 
The restructuring of the organisation into business groups improved the internal 
architecture of each research area through (i) the specific focus of each business unit on an 
identifiable industry that matched the domain of the federal industry Government granting 
body, and (ii) the establishment of an active advisory governance board for each business 
group that provides a commercial focus.  Members on this advisory board were also chosen 
because of their positions with external funding bodies and lobbying groups. The advisory 
boards in particular have brought an accountability measured in outcomes. 
Architecture. Architecture in Kay’s model includes internal relationship architecture, external 
relationship architecture and network relationship architecture.  
Internal relationship architecture: With the exception that some staff viewed the change in 
internal structure as just one more (ineffective) reshuffle of the card deck, many reported 
increased morale with the new business groups arrangements with an opportunity to take on 
more significant and larger projects with a clear set of objectives. This increased morale was 
confirmed in an organisational culture survey, (Sun State Report, 1999).   For instance in one 
business group, staff articulated that working together with a common purpose and 
establishing teams with a focus on one commodity across regions brought together much of 
the knowledge and experiential practices that strengthened their delivery and their sense of 
identity. 
External relationship architecture.  For Kay, competitive advantage also flows from 
improvements in the architectures in place to guide the informal relationships between staff 
and those stakeholders outside of the organization. For Sun State Agriculture, the 
reorganisation of its internal structure had major impact on the rules and ways staff interacted 
with stakeholders.  Some staff stated that the new focus on one area within each business 
groups gave them a clear point of contact from industry and gave instances that industry 
appreciated being able to ‘go straight to the source’.  These changes in access through the 
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external architecture between the firm and suppliers or customers appears to have increased 
commercial relationships with businesses and a with more value chain target approach.  The 
Advisory Board created for each business groups provided commercial expertise to the 
business group and encouraged tighter business practices as well as strengthening the links 
with industry members (Baker, Radcliffe & Wissemann, 1999). 
Network relationship architecture. Whereas the external relationship architecture addresses 
changes in 1:1 relationships, Kay also pointed out the strategic competitive advantage of 
strengthening the informal and implicit ways the organization generates advantages through 
forming multiparty alliances or networks of relationships.  Our data suggests that external 
linkages with networks or between groups of collaborating firms have increased, with 
improved relationships with the R&D corporations. Business groups established clear roles in 
the provision of R&D, from the development of concept proposal negotiated with producers 
and sponsors, to the delivery of R&D outcomes. Following a review of R&D (Baker et al, 
1999) within the last twelve months, these business units have loosely reassembled into a 
central agency to capitalise on their separate strengths and to rebuild synergy (Baker et 
al.1999). Historically, resource relations indicate increased provision as well as favoured 
status. After the restructuring into provider groups, the new departmental structure was driven 
more by cooperation and partnership, than by competition. This is not surprising. In 
traditional business networks, cooperation, adaptations, trust, commitment between actors 
develops slowly over time (Moller and Wilson, 1995; Ford et al. 1998: 25-30).  
When the R&D business groups were established, strong resource ties existed within the 
Departmental network. The most obvious were the common “corporate support” across the 
entire department, including common information systems, accounting systems, legal 
services, HR services, RD&E policy advice, export development, and rural industry business 
services. These resources were spread across all business units across the whole department, 
with consequences for staff movements and implementing software to facilitate activity links. 
Strong physical resource ties also existed horizontally between the business groups. It is not 
uncommon for business groups/institutes to share sites and equipment and this shared space 
increases the potential for horizontal activity links between business groups. 
This resource tie has been an important factor shaping the relationship between the business 
groups and the internal purchaser. More importantly, corporate identity influences the 
relationship between institutes and industry groups, since it is crucial in shaping the external 
perceptions of Institutes and providing a competitive advantage against other public sector 
R&D organisations for funding from R&D corporations and here their relational architecture, 
their track record of innovation, the reputation of its staff and strategic assets play important 
roles. 
Kay argues that the architecture adds value to individual contributions through the 1) 
creation of organizational knowledge, 2) the establishment of a cooperative ethic, and by 3) 
the implementation of organizational routines.  We examine each of these areas in relation to 
the business groups in Sun State agriculture.  
The creation of organizational knowledge is an ongoing process and following the 
establishment of the business groups, the new organisational knowledge being developed is 
different to the prior operational knowledge and former routines. This knowledge 
development is more strategic in approach, setting research priorities with increased focus on 
their own research agenda and beginning to drive their own agenda.  
The larger organisation has previously prided itself on its cooperative ethic (‘Sun State’ 
Annual Reports) and one of the benefits from the business group structure was the 
development of closer bonds with people within the business groups who were challenged to 
make each business group a financial as well as an R&D success, while working within tight 
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constraints. One consequence was that looser relationships with other parts of the original 
department developed.  
New organisational routines. The restructuring into business groups and the new fiscal 
processes have challenged some of the prior organisational routines. New organizational 
routines for solving problems at a business group level, routines for financial management at 
a business groups level, routines for handling non-performance issues, routines for quality 
checking of project proposals prior to lodgement with external funding organisations have all 
been developed.  Other processes such as increased focused on communicating and marketing 
outcomes of R&D internally to the larger organization and to the CEO and Minister as well as 
other important stakeholders have taken longer to establish. 
5.  Discussion 
 
The above case illustrates that the notions of sustainable competitive advantage based on 
distinct capabilities have some resonance with public sector R&D organisations. The roles of 
public sector science organisations are not only to carry out research, development and 
extension with client groups and with industry bodies but also to compete with other public 
sector organisations and University based research groups for funds. However, it does not 
easily account for Governments’ role in freely giving away its knowledge to create new 
industries or to engage in high risk and low immediate return on investment activities that 
address market failure nor does it adequately capture the all too common situation where an 
organization does not have control of its destiny, but is dependent upon the whims of an 
external body, in this case a Ministerial cabinet. 
In both the competitive advantage and IMP frameworks, the importance of relationships 
with other firms and networks of firms as resources is recognized, but the case suggests that 
recognition alone does not provide an organisation with sufficient understanding of the 
constraints that the political and economic resource dependencies place on what its business is 
and the ways it can best structure itself to achieve business objectives.  As highlighted in 
resource dependency theory, because organisations are not self-contained or self–sufficient, 
the organization’s dependence on its environment makes the external constraint and control of 
organizational behaviour both possible and almost inevitable (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Frooman (1999) extends the resource dependency argument by viewing power as an attribute 
of the relationship between the actors. Resource dependence exists “when one actor is 
supplying another with a resource that is marked by 1) concentration (suppliers are few in 
number), 2) controllability, 3) nonmobility, 4) nonsubstitutability or essentiality. All of these 
attributes can be easily applied to the situation of  ‘Sun State’.  For Frooman, the essentiality 
of a resource is itself a function of two factors: relative magnitude of exchange and criticality. 
For Public Sector organizations, their critical dependency on Ministerial cabinet decisions is 
legendary and tactics for shaping it are well documented in the long running episodes of “Yes 
Minister”.  
We suggest that the inclusion of resource dependency considerations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) where differences in the dependence of a firm on its external stakeholders for resources 
provides one way to account for differences in the performance of public sector firms 
managing the competitive advantage paradox. It also helps address the issue of how firms can 
succeed in not only being guided by a profit motive, but by other triple bottom line 
considerations as serving community and the environment- for these objectives are those held 
by these controlling external stakeholders whose favour is essential. In the case of Sun State, 
the shifts in structures displayed in Figure 1 can be explained in terms of changing resource 
dependencies. It is these dependencies that limit the areas in which competition in the public 
sector is allowed and at times encouraged and where Kay’s notions of strategic competitive 
 10
advantage are applicable. While this case illustrates this need to include resource dependency 
contingencies when managing a public sector organisation, we believe that the lesson also 
holds for firms in the private sector in situations where there are restrictions on what 
businesses a firm can strategically collaborate with for instance, when there are single 
suppliers, where there no possibility of replacement Managers in both public sector and 
private sector firms focus on sustainable competitive advantage, using the resources and 
capabilities of their organisation and their coordination and application. While Kay’s model 
articulates the components of this advantage including the internal and external relationships 
and the network of relationships as the architecture that it frames, managers also use their 
knowledge of resource dependencies of their organisations in choosing their objectives and 
means of obtaining them. 
Implications for managers and researchers 
 
The current form of the Sun State organisation attempts to maximise the resources of the firm 
in context of competition with other public sector agencies. The constraints these departments 
face as well as their competitive advantage can be explained by resource dependency. As 
private sector organisations move to more triple bottom line approaches where their ability to 
survive is tied to a certain extent with their reputation not just to profitability, we will find 
resource dependency arguments are increasingly applicable to the private sector. Kay’s advice 
for improving private sector firm performance is not to engage in triple bottom line 
approaches “the less often that managers are forced to choose between corporate advantage 
and social concerns the better it will be for all “(Kay 1995: 234). 
Our case study illustrates the weaknesses of his argument where organisations have 
mandated multiple objectives or have a restriction in choice of actions because of their 
dependencies for survival on a limited number of external constituents. For public sector 
organisations, established and funded to provide public good, these are not exceptions but the 
general case. Our analyses suggest that the notions of sustained competitive advantage and the 
resource based view of the firm do have some application for public sector organisations, but 
this application is limited to situations where competition is sanctioned and is possible. An 
implication of this is that managers is need to recognise that they are often simultaneously 
managing within multiple structures, some that fit Kay’s notion of strategic competitive 
advantage, others that do not. These structures can (and do) co-exist to meet these different 
resource dependent objectives. 
Resource dependency theory has much to add to the application of Kay’s model for 
addressing issues of sustainable competitive advantage, whether the firm is in the public or 
private sector. However before this can occur more research is needed on ways that managers 
deal with sustainable competitive advantage notions alongside control systems or structures 
that have been put in place to achieve other objectives associated with public good. 
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Figure 1. Changes in Sun State Agricultural RD&E from pre 1997 where scientific disciplines were distributed through 
Regionalised structures, to 1997-99 Industry Institute/ Provider Business groups, to post 1999 Agency of Food and Fibre 
Sciences as a coordinated Alliance of R&D Institutes/Business groups. 
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